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Abstract— This work details the concept of a novel net-
work security model called the Super NIC (SNIC) and
a Hybrid Super Switch (HSS). The design will ultimately
incorporate deep packet inspection (DPI), intrusion detec-
tion and prevention (IDS/IPS) functions, as well as network
access control technologies therefore making all end-point
network devices inherently secure. The SNIC and HSS
functions are modelled using a transparent GNU/Linux
Bridge with the Netfilter framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s network security outfit, Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS), Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) and
Stateful Packet Inspection (SPI) firewalls are the current
trends that play a major role in securing networks from
abuse and malicious attacks [1].
However, these systems are incapable of, for instance,
detecting and responding to day-zero vulnerabilities in a
web or mail server. Hence, the most lethal and successful
compromises on networks have exploited vulnerabilities
that stateful firewalls and IDSs cannot normally mitigate.
This owes to the fact that these systems are ignorant
of the idiosyncrasies of the various application-level
protocols. There arises the need for infrastructure that
better understand various application protocols, and which
can closely examine the packets at wire-speed to detect
and dynamically isolate any anomalies/suspicions in the
network traffic.
In this paper, the concept and design goals of a novel
security architecture is presented as part of ongoing
research. The Hybrid Super Switch (HSS) and Super
Network Interface Card (SNIC), mitigate issues such as
spoofing of MAC addresses at the data link layer of
the OSI model and ultimately move up to content-based
filtering in layer-7 of the OSI network model. This novel
model will reduce processing overhead by distributing the
processing work between the HSS and the SNIC made
feasible by previous research [2]–[6].
A long-term aim in the research is to incorporate the
SNIC and HSS functions into ASICs and network pro-
cessors to achieve processing efficiency at high network
throughput. The authors envisage that network interface
cards and switches will have these technologies as basic.
The solution also aims to be non-proprietary in nature.
The paper is structured as follows: A background on the
typical network security deployments is given including
an overview of past and present network security solu-
tions. The NAC concept is introduced with a critique
of vendor specific implementations. The ensuing sections
then deal with tests conducted on a prototype/generic
corporate network detailing how the proposed security
model can mitigate a day-zero exploit and concludes by
detailing the thrust of future research efforts.
II. RELATED WORK
Recent advances in endpoint security has resulted in
commercial vendors [7]–[9] introducing their own im-
plementations to proffer solutions and establish their
market share. Some of these network admission and
control (NAC) implementations require software agents
to be deployed in endpoint machines making deployment
clumsy and obtrusive. Other equipment vendors [10], [11]
require additional standalone server infrastructure. This
may be as a result of vendors’ decision to build upon
their existing infrastructure base hence possibly inheriting
flawed security implementations. Intel’s vPro technology
[12] while very promising, is primarily meant for out-of-
band management of end-users’ computers and also re-
quires a very high specification machine as a minimum re-
quirement. Microsoft’s network access protection (NAP)
[9] while appearing to be a NAC solution, is mainly
used to enforce endpoint device compliance with current
patches and virus updates prior to being granted network
access. The HSS/SNiC framework proposed integrates
security into the basic building blocks of PC networks—
the switch (wired or wireless) and the endpoint network
interface card. Past and current research efforts [13]–[16]
also indicate this paradigm shift to deploying security
into end-user devices though practical real-world deploy-
ments are lacking. The authors believe implementing
an opensource intrusion detection framework where all
available opensource security frameworks are deployed
down at the network interface card, it will go a long
way in speeding up development as well as facilitating
widespread adoption.
III. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
A. Objectives
The aim of the experiment presented here is to demon-
strate that in collapsing a holistic implementation of
security at all layers of the OSI model down to the
network interface card, it is possible to mitigate day zero
network compromises using our model.
B. Evaluation criteria
The indicators used in this experiment are rudimentary.
Within the limits of the experiment, the evaluation criteria
is based on the ability of the attack vector employed
to successfully achieve privilege escalation on the target.
Since the system is at present synthesized on commodity
PC hardware, throughput and bandwidth tests are not not
required at this stage of the work.
C. Framework
This work is based on the premise that in order
for a pervasive security solution to scale efficiently, a
distributed, per-endpoint implementation is more desir-
able. Using this concept we synthesize the HSS/SNiC
framework using opensource tools. This has the following
advantages:
• Allowing the further extensibility of the implemen-
tation
• Providing a trusted and tested platform for intrusion
detection research
• Accelerating the development process by leveraging
on existing GNU/Linux security toolsets.
D. Experimental method
A dated data-driven exploit is chosen for this experi-
ment to simulate a day zero scenario. For this, the IIS
file/directory traversal vulnerability [17] is chosen and is
run on a Windows 2000 server with a patch-level less
than service pack 3 and running IIS 5.0. A GNU/Linux
transparent bridge is inserted inline to the web server
and appropriate policies are deployed in it. The policies
will take into account the direction of traffic flow, known
source and destination MAC addresses.
E. Test bed
The HSS/SNiC model is synthesized using a combi-
nation of GNU/Linux and FreeBSD systems with their
functionality built upon the Netfilter [18], l7-filter [19]
and SNORT [20] frameworks. These are setup as transpar-
ent bridges as well as DHCP, DNS, and default gateway
devices. The physical topology of the test network is
shown in figure 1.
The firewall runs a stable version of FreeBSD with the
OpenBSD packet filtering engine [21]. In order to make
the network homogeneous, the firewalls also serves as a
DHCP and DNS server for the client machines as well
as a default gateway. This way, a endpoint device only
needs to talk to the default gateway at any point in time.
In reality the attacker and the victim/client is put into
separate networks via VLANs defined on a cisco switch
to simulate a heterogeneous network and a trunk port is
connected to the router/firewall which has the appropriate
sub-interfaces and routing defined. An additional host
running a tftp server is put in another vlan to simulate
a scenario whereby an attacker attempts to make a con-
nection to an external server hosting some exploit code.
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Fig. 1. Physical experimental network.
F. Test procedure
The IIS file/directory traversal vulnerability exploit is
broken down into three sessions for the purposes of
analysis.
• Connection to port 80 of webserver by http request
with malformed URL
http://[victim-ip]/scripts/..%255cwinnt/
system32/cmd.exe?/c+dir+c:\
• Tftp egress to download netcat binary by malformed
http request
http://[victim-ip]/scripts/..%255cwinnt/
system32/cmd.exe?/tftp+-i+rogue_ip+get+
nc.exe+-l+10000
• Execution of netcat binary on compromised IIS
server to yield command line access
nc <victim_ip_> -p 10000
To simulate the SNiC functionality, a set of ipta-
bles/ebtables/arptables rules are deployed on the bridge
in-line to the web server as shown in figure 2.
#Initialize Netfilter framework to sane state
iptables -F
iptables -X
#Set default FORWARD chain policy
iptables -P FORWARD DROP
#Make and init special chain called x_STATE
iptables -N x_STATE
iptables -F x_STATE
#Drop illegal states
iptables -A x_STATE -m state --state INVALID -j DROP
iptables -A x_STATE -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
#Set up inbound access to IIS web server
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp -d 192.168.160.33 --dport 80 -j ACCEPT
#drop unwanted external HTTP requests
iptables -A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 80 -m limit --limit 5/minute -j LOG
Fig. 2. Security policies applied in-line to IIS web server
It is noted that the rules above are specific to the
webserver. The ethos of the framework being proposed
is that individual devices can possess varied security
credentials based on policy.
In order to verify the integrity of tests, the following
precautions were taken
1) The network is monitored in an idle state to ensure
that background traffic on the network is not so
significant as to influence the results. The bridging
protocol traffic is negligent and can be ignored or
filtered out.
2) Capture scripts are written to simultaneously cap-
ture traffic on both the ingress and egress interfaces
of the in-line transparent bridge. This, besides the
fact that it gives two capture files to compare with,
also provides a means of calculating the forwarding
delay between the in/out interfaces.
3) The tests are run multiple times to ensure consis-
tency in the results obtained bearing in mind the
deterministic nature of Ethernet traffic.
IV. RESULTS
A. Phase 1
It is observed that phase 1 of the attack succeeds and
yields a directory listing of files in the IIS servers root
directory as indicated by the characters ‘c+dir+c:\’
at the end of the malformed URL request. This also means
that any code in the compromised servers $PATH variable
can be executed.
B. Phase 2
Phase 2 of the attack involves a tftp egress to download
a netcat binary. The remote command execution fails and
logs on the bridge and tftp server also confirm that no
file transfer occurred during this phase of the attack.
Table I shows two frames captured from phase 2. The
first frame, a tftp request from the IIS server, as initiated
by the attacker(via malformed URL) to the tftp server,
is repeated 5 times before timing out as shown in the
second frame. Spurious Ethernet bridging protocol traffic
have been omitted for brevity.
TABLE I
ATTACK PHASE 2: PACKET CAPTURE SHOWING TFTP REQUEST
FAILURE AS A RESULT OF MITIGATION
Frame# Time(s) Source IP Destination IP Protocol Info
7910 9766.100532 192.168.160.33 192.168.101.252 tftp Request,file:nc.exe
Transfer type: octet
7912 9769.303839 192.168.160.33 192.168.101.252 tftp Error Code, Code: Not defined,
Message: timeout on receive
C. Phase 3
The third phase of the exploit fails since the security
policy that mitigates phase 2 of the attack also prevents
further privilege escalation via tftp egress.
V. ANALYSIS
Phase 1 of the exploit succeeds as expected since at
this stage the synthesized HSS/SNiC doesn’t yet possess
any layer-7 intelligence so as to determine malicious
intent by URL handling, string matching etc.. Hence, the
malformed URL request to the server is passed through all
security checks and the attack penetrates security looking
at the vulnerability in the http service in the server. Phase
2 remote command execution fails as expected since the
security policy deployed in the bridge in-line to the server
do not explicitly permit egress traffic to an unknown
destination.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The experiment presented in this work support the
need for a more pervasive and decentralized endpoint
security solution and proposes the HSS/SNiC framework
as a viable and practical solution. Though present in the
original design of the framework, the tests presented here
deliberately do not feature any layer-7 intelligence. This
is because a day zero scenario is being simulated with
no prior knowledge of its nature. It is however trivial
to include a single line that introduces the Snort IDS
into the iptables execution path hence enabling it detect
both data-driven attacks and viruses. This shows that a
structured security policy that spans all seven layers of the
OSI model can be deployed down to a network interface
card hence distributing the burden of endpoint security
among endpoint machines while under the strict auspices
of a policy-enforcing switch. Recent advances facilitate
the deployment of complex IDS signatures in ASICS and
network processor units (NPU) with speeds approaching
5Gbps [3] , and more recently 12Gbps [22]. This also
makes the proposed solution feasible for use in end-user,
SOHO and high bandwidth applications. Further work
will also concentrate on the mechanism by which the
SNiC authenticate and exchange updates with the HSS.
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